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YALE

LAW

JOURNAL

COMMENT

Section 5 Constraints on Congress Through the Lens
of Article III and the Constitutionality of the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act
INTRODUCTION

The Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA),' which would prohibit
state and most private employers from discriminating against their employees
based on sexual orientation and gender identity, is now stalled in Congress.'
While this may only be a short-term setback, some worry about the long-term
viability of certain ENDA provisions. What Congress eventually gives, courts
can take away.' Commentators fear that under recent precedent, the Supreme
Court will find that Congress has exceeded its enforcement powers under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and invalidate provisions in ENDA
that render states liable to suits by their employees for discrimination. Because
the rationale behind the Court's new and evolving Section 5 analysis is unclear,
activists are unsure what arguments will convince the Court of the
constitutionality of the state-suit provisions.
Section i of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from state
infringement of constitutional rights.' Under Section 5 of the Amendment,
Congress can "enforce" Section 1 by, for example, subjecting states to lawsuits

1.

H.R. 3017, ilith Cong.

2.

3.

See Matt Baume, ENDA Vote in Doubt amid FuriousProtests, BAY AREA REP., Sept. 16, 2010,
at 3, available at http://www.ebar.com/news/article.php ?sec= news&article= 5o69.
See, e.g., William D. Araiza, ENDA Before It Starts: Section 5 of the FourteenthAmendment and
the Availability ofDamagesAwards to Gay State Employees Under the ProposedEmployment NonDiscriminationAct, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (2002).

4.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

(2009).
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when they violate rights.' Under existing jurisprudence, the Court upholds
legislation under Section 5 only if it fulfills two conditions. First, Congress
cannot expand the scope of a substantive constitutional right beyond the limits
that the Court has set for that right. Second, before stripping states of
sovereign immunity and rendering a state liable to suit for violations of a
certain right, Congress must document evidence that the state has violated the
right in the past. Part I of this Comment describes how ENDA meets these two
requirements, as Congress has collected evidence of specific incidents of state
discrimination against lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) 6 employees that would
probably be unconstitutional under the Court's existing antidiscrimination
jurisprudence.
However, as Part II explains, key Justices have indicated that Section 5
legislation may have to fulfill a third condition to be constitutional. In recent
cases, these Justices have expressed discomfort with legislation that prohibits
unconstitutional behavior that states have already forbidden. Congress, they
feel, should not displace state schemes, even when there is evidence of
discrimination against state employees, if states are already acting to prevent
this discrimination. This potential third requirement has hitherto been ignored
in the literature. Advocates, however, are concerned that ENDA may flunk this
requirement, as many states have already outlawed LGB discrimination.
Commentators have struggled to understand what animates the Court's
jurisprudence in the Section 5 arena. After pointing out that text and precedent
cannot justify its analysis, some commentators suggest that the Court is merely
demoting Congress to the role of a quasi-administrative agency in this area by
forcing it to collect evidence to justify its regulations. As I explain, this analogy
is problematic for several reasons, including its failure to explain why certain
Justices become troubled when Congress displaces existing rights-protecting
state legislation with federal legislation.
Yet it is clear that key Justices are seeking to impose certain limits upon
Congress's powers vis-Ai-vis the states and that they are still in the process of
defining the structure and logic of these limits. In Part III, I argue that this
logic resembles that which courts use to restrain themselves from interfering
with the political branches of government.' Section 5 requirements that focus
on existing state remedies are analogous to Article III mootness constraints:
just as courts cannot consider controversies that have been resolved, so too

5.

Id. 55 .

6.

My argument's relevance is limited largely to sexual orientation discrimination, upon which
I focus.

7.

See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
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must Congress's power to strip states of sovereign immunity be limited when
states themselves are taking steps to remedy the problem. Yet courts will
examine a controversy when defendants voluntarily cease their wrongdoing if
they are capable of resuming it. Similarly, Congress should be able to remedy
unconstitutional discrimination that the discriminator is voluntarily correcting,
especially if the discriminator may resume discriminating.
In this Comment, I do not seek to justify the new Section 5 requirement
that I identify. Rather, I merely delineate its limits: just as mootness doctrine is
limited in its application in certain cases, so too must these restraints on
Section 5 legislation be limited when states voluntarily put in place measures
that are subject to repeal.
1.

THE FIRST TWO CONSTRAINTS: JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND
PROOF OF EXISTING VIOLATIONS

The Court began developing its new Section 5 jurisprudence in 1997 with
City of Boerne v. Flores. In an earlier case, the Court had limited the First
Amendment's protections against state infringement of religious practices.'
Invoking its Section 5 power, Congress sought to overrule the Court by
expanding the rights of religious institutions against states. In Boerne, the
Court struck down this legislative attempt to expand First Amendment rights
beyond the limits that the Court had set. Congress, it held, cannot legislate into
existence constitutional rights unrecognized by the Court.
The Court is unlikely to overturn ENDA by finding that it expands
individuals' rights against state sexual orientation discrimination beyond the
limits the Court has prescribed. While the Supreme Court has never squarely
prohibited state discrimination against LGB employees under the Equal
Protection Clause, both the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court have long
hinted that federal employees may enjoy constitutional protection against
dismissal because of their sexual orientation-even when national security
concerns are involved."o After Lawrence v. Texas," ENDA's position is even
more secure. Lawrence's analysis was unclear, and a circuit split exists, as to the

8.

521 U.S. 507 (1997).

9.

Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

1o.

See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (allowing the district court to review the due
process claim brought by a man dismissed from the CIA because of his sexual orientation);
Norton v. Macey, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (referring to possible due process
protections against federal discrimination on the basis of homosexuality).
3.9 U.S. 558 (2003).
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level of scrutiny employed in that case." However, if the sodomy statute in
Lawrence "furthered no legitimate state interest," therefore flunking even
rational basis scrutiny, states would be hard-pressed to justify LGB
discrimination in state employment."
According to the second requirement of the Court's Section 5
jurisprudence, Congress can subject a state to suit for discrimination only if it
collects evidence of past unconstitutional state discrimination. The Court first
developed this requirement in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,'4 when the
Court struck down Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)"
provisions that allowed employee suits against states. Subsequently, University
ofAlabama v. Garrett6 invalidated key Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)"
provisions. Most recently, the Court in Tennessee v. Lane' approved ADA
provisions that putatively enforced disabled individuals' due process right to
court access. Similarly, in Nevada v. Hibbs," the Court found that the state-suit
provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)2 o vindicated state
employees' rights against sex discrimination.
In each of these cases, the Justices siding with the states reviewed the
preenactment evidence before Congress and found insufficient proof of state
discrimination to warrant legislation stripping states of their sovereign
immunity. The Kimel majority emphasized the need to find a "pattern of
constitutional violations" that had been committed "'by the States"'2' and
disparaged the actual evidence, which "consist[ed] almost entirely of isolated

Compare Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (1ith Cir.

12.

2004) (reading Lawrence to deny heightened scrutiny to gays), with Cook v. Gates, 528 F. 3 d

Cir. 2oo8) (applying heightened scrutiny to discrimination against gays, as it
burdens them for engaging in constitutionally protected sexual activity), and Witt v. Dep't
of the Air Force, 527 F.3 d 8o6 (9th Cir. 2008) (same).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. Though concerns over blackmail were prevalent in the past, they
have now become irrelevant in the many cases in which LGB employees are open about their
sexual orientation.
42 (1st

13.

14.

528 U.S. 62 (2000).

15.

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No.
at

29

U.S.C.

§§

90-202,

81 Stat.

602

(codified

621-634 (206)).

16.

531 U.S. 356

17.

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as

(2001).

amended at 42

U.S.C.

§5 12101-12213

(20o6)).

541 U.S. 509 (2004).

18.

538 U.S. 721 (2003).
2o. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,

19.

29

U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (20o6)).

21.

528 U.S. at 82 (quoting and adding emphasis to Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640 (1999)).
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sentences clipped from floor debates and legislative reports."" The Garrett
Court criticized Congress's failure to find a "pattern of unconstitutional
discrimination" that "deal[t] with the activities of States."2 3 Similarly, Justice
Kennedy's dissent in Hibbs focused on the "paucity of evidence" of state
discrimination.
ENDA is likely to satisfy this second evidentiary requirement, as well.
Congress now benefits from hindsight that it lacked in writing the ADEA, ADA
and FMLA-all passed before the Court decided Boerne." With ENDA,
Congress has been careful to insert evidence of anti-gay state discrimination
into the legislative record, soliciting extensive testimony about LGB
employment discrimination by states. For example, it entered into the record a
year-long, fifty-state study conducted by the Williams Institute, a think tank
on LGBT issues, which concluded that "there is a widespread and persistent
pattern of unconstitutional discrimination against LGB[]state government
employees, as well as against local government employees."12 6 Similarly,
Professor William Eskridge testified that history revealed a widespread pattern
of state discrimination against gays and of homosexual purges in state
government. 27
Thus, ENDA should survive the first two constraints the Court has placed
on Section 5 legislation: Boerne's prohibition on the creation of new rights and
Kimel's evidence-of-discrimination requirement.
II. THE GROWING FOCUS ON EXISTING STATE AND LOCAL
REMEDIES

Recent developments, however, suggest that the Court is poised to demand
even more from Congress when it legislates under Section 5. Several members
of the Court-notably Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas-have

22.

Id. at 89.

23.

531 U.S. at 368-72.

24.

538 U.S. at 754 (Kennedy,

J.,

dissenting); see also id. at 745-49.

25.

The ADEA, ADA, and FMLA were passed in 1967, 1990, and 1993, respectively. See supra
notes i5, 17, 20.

26.

H.R. 3017, Employment Non-DiscriminationAct of 2oo9: HearingBefore the H. Comm. on Educ.
& Labor, iith Cong. 47, 51 (2009) (statement of R. Bradley Sears, Exec. Director, The
Williams Institute on Sexual Orientation Law and Public Policy, UCLA School of Law),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-1iihhrg52242/pdf/CHRG
-milhhrgs2242.pdf.

27.

Id. at 44-46 (statement of William Eskridge, Jr., John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence,
Yale Law School).
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increasingly focused on whether states have already targeted the problem
Congress is attempting to solve through the legislation in question. The
requirement has slowly evolved through the line of Section 5 cases. Kimel
references these remedies innocuously, noting in a footnote in its final
paragraph that "[s]tate employees are protected by state age discrimination
statutes" and citing the statutes of forty-eight states." The list is inserted not to
tell Congress that legislation was unneeded, but to offer assurance that the
Court's "decision .. . does not signal the end of the line for employees who find
themselves subject to age discrimination . . . [since state-provided] avenues of

relief remain available . . . ."" This issue received similarly short shrift in
Garrett, when Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority "that by the time
that Congress enacted the ADA in 1990, every State in the Union had enacted
such measures," 0o but neglected to say why the point was relevant.
In Hibbs, however, the significance of existing state and local remedies
moved into clear focus in Justice Kennedy's dissent, which was joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas. Instead of relegating a discussion of state remedies
to footnotes, as did Kimel and Garrett, Justice Kennedy filled two pages of the
United States Reports with support for his claim that "States appear to have been
ahead of Congress in providing gender-neutral family leave benefits."31 His
point was that "the States were in the process of solving any existing genderbased discrimination in the provision of family leave"; he therefore decried
"the displacement of the State's scheme by a federal one."" In Justice
Kennedy's view, by taking steps to address their own unconstitutional
behavior, states render their discrimination moot, and Congress has no
business stripping states of sovereign immunity to solve a problem that has
been (or is in the process of being) solved.
Litigants' briefing has increasingly emphasized this reasoning. In Kimel,
only one of the five briefs (including amicus curiae briefs) challenging the
legislation discussed state provisions in detail." The Garrett docket contained
two briefs (out of a total of eight for the petitioner) that discussed state

28. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 & n.* (2000).
29.

Id. at 91-92.

30.

Bd. ofTrs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 n.5 (2001).

31. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 750 (2003) (Kennedy,
id. at 750-52.
32.

Id. at 750, 755.

33.

See Brief for Respondents at 2-3, Kimel, 528 U.S. 62 (No. 98-791).
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remedies in any detail." In Hibbs, however, five out of seven briefs discussed in
detail how states were ahead of Congress." They claimed that, given state
policies, the harm was "speculat[ive]" and could not justify Section 5 action,3
and that Congress should have studied the "corrective power of state . . .
policies" before acting." Thus, showing that Section 5 legislation does not
displace existing state and local remedies has become increasingly important.
This condition could very well become dispositive, if, as some commentators
expect, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas are joined in their concerns by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. 8
The state-and-local-remedies condition is of fundamental importance in
the ENDA context. The rapidity with which state and local provisions have
been adopted to fight sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace,
combined with the fact that states and localities continue to adopt these
remedies, might suggest to the Court that Congress should leave the solution
to states and localities. Before 1989, only one state and the District of Columbia
had a policy prohibiting discrimination against its employees based on sexual
orientation. 9 That number rose to eleven states by 2000,40 and since then to

34. Brief for Petitioners at 2-3, Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (No. 99-1240); Brief for Hawaii et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19, Garrett,531 U.S. 356 (No. 99-1240).
3s.

Brief for the Petitioner at 30-35, Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (No. 01-1368); Reply Brief for
Petitioners at 18, Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (No. 01-1368); Brief for the State of Alabama et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5-15, Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (No. 01-1368); Brief of
Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 18, Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721
(No. 01-1368); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 16-17, Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (No. 01-1368).

36. Brief of Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 18, supra note
35, at 1
37.

Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 35, at 18.

38. No analysis has identified the existing-remedies requirement in Section 5 jurisprudence.
Thus, few have considered whether Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito will adopt it.
However, more generally, commentators have suggested that these Justices will take a
narrow view of congressional power in this area. See Christopher Banks & John Blakeman,

Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and New Federalism jurisprudence, 38 PUBLIUS: THE

J. OF

FEDERALISM 576, 577 (2008) (examining the records of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito prior to their elevation to the Court and concluding that they will likely side with
Justices Scalia and Thomas, and thus that "new federalism ... depend[s] upon Justice ...
Kennedy's swing vote"); see also Chittister v. Dep't of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 226 F. 3d 223 ( 3d
Cir. 2000) (then-Judge Alito striking down provisions of the FMLA later upheld in Hibbs).
39.

HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE FOR LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND
AMERICANs 2007-2008, at 8 (2008), http://www.hrc.org/documents/

TRANSGENDER

HRCFoundation State of the Workplace_2007-2008.pdf.
40. Id.
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twenty-one.4 1 In states that have not prohibited anti-gay discrimination,
numerous cities and counties have created antidiscrimination policies. 42
Strikingly, state and local governments are taking these steps to protect gay
employees despite mobilization against gay rights in other areas: for example,
twenty-nine states have outlawed same-sex marriage by constitutional
amendment since 2000.43 This suggests that, in spite of a generally negative
attitude toward sexual minorities, states are committing themselves to the
protection of these minorities in employment.
Besides raising problems for ENDA, the new requirement adds to the
confusion of Section 5 doctrine. It sits uncomfortably with the existingevidence-collection requirement. If the Court allows Congress to act only when
limited state or local remedies exist, but at the same time requires Congress to
show evidence of past state discrimination, Congress would be placed in a
catch-22. In collecting evidence of discrimination, Congress and scholars
generally only document recorded complaints of discrimination. These records
generally will exist only if individuals file official complaints, which they
usually have reason to do only if they know that their state or local
governments prohibit discrimination. But if this prohibition exists, the Court
may then consider congressional legislation unnecessary.
Moreover, the new requirement adds to the opacity that already
characterizes Section 5 doctrine, the underlying justification for which has
always been somewhat unclear. Boerne, which prevented Congress from
reinterpreting constitutional rights, could be read as simply underscoring the
constitutional position of the Court as the final arbiter of those rights. The
Court's claim to this position has a venerable history.
However, the origins of the evidence-collection requirement are somewhat
mysterious. Grounding the requirement in text is unavailing. Section 5 speaks
of Congress's "power to enforce," not merely to remedy violations of the
amendment's provisions." The Kimel Court suggested that precedent dictates
the requirement, and cited back to Boerne; however, Boerne merely prohibits
Congress from expanding a constitutional right. Where rights do exist, nothing
in Boerne suggests that Congress could not legislate to protect the rights from
state infringement, whether or not it had evidence that the rights were being

RIGHTS

CAMPAIGN,

STATEWIDE

EMPLOYMENT

LAWS

AND

41.

HUMAN

42.

http://www.hrc.org/documents/Employment Laws andPolicies.pdf.
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, supra note 39, at 8.

43.

HUMAN

RIGHTS

CAMPAIGN,

STATEWIDE

MARRIAGE

http://www.hrc.org/documents/marriage prohibitions_2009.pdf.
44.
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violated. In fact, the Boerne Court referred to Section 5 powers as "preventive"
nine times in its opinion."5 Further historical analysis of this requirement is
beyond the scope of this Comment.46 However, Boerne by itself suggests that
through its preventive power, Congress could subject states to suits to prevent
violations "[r]egardless of the state of the record," 4 whether or not Congress
had evidence of unconstitutional state conduct.
Some commentators have suggested that the Court is trying to effect an
institutional alteration of power through its evidence-collection requirement.
They argue that the Court has borrowed this requirement from administrative
law: Section 5 review is seen as analogous to review of agency action for
"arbitrary and capricious" behavior under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), where the Court reviews the agency record.4' Thus, the doctrine is
actually a means for the Court to alter Congress's role into that of a quasiadministrative agency. Commentators proceed to criticize the doctrine based
on this conclusion. Yet, if this is true, it is unclear why the Court specifically
requires Congress to document a pattern of existing violations. After all,
agencies need not show evidence of statutory violations before creating a rule.
Similarly, administrative review under the APA's arbitrary and capricious
standard involves many other requirements, such as a demonstration of
responsiveness to publicly solicited comments, which the Court has not
imported into the Section 5 context.
Finally, when it meets the Court's new tendency to examine existing
remedies, the administrative analogy founders completely. No court decision
that I have found has ever struck down an agency regulation because the
regulatees were successfully self-regulating. Analysis and criticism of Section 5
doctrine, therefore, cannot be based on the claim that the Court is simply
demoting Congress to the status of a quasi-administrative agency.

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 passim (1997).
46. One potential source for this requirement is Justice Black's opinion, announcing the
judgment of the Court in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 130 (1970), which required both
that Congress make "legislative findings" providing "substantial evidence" that "States ...
disenfranchise[d] voters on account of race," and that Section 5 legislation be tied to the
elimination of such discrimination. However, Justice Black wrote only for himself.
45.

47. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.

48. See, e.g., A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme
Court'sNew "On the Record" ConstitutionalReview ofFederal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328
(2001); William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 87 (2001).
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III.A RATIONALE AND A COUNTERARGUMENT

Robert Post and Reva Siegel have provided an alternative rationale for the
Court's doctrine. They have suggested that by banning Congress from altering
the judicial recognition of rights and by requiring rigorous evidence collection,
the Court has imposed limitations on Congress that are drawn from the
context of the courtoom. 4 9 Similarly, I argue that instead of relying on the
administrative law analogy, a more convincing account of the new existingremedies requirement can be drawn from the mootness doctrine of selfrestraint that courts impose on themselves. This doctrine requires courts to
restrict their activity to situations in which there is an actual case or
controversy. Should the controversy end due to a change in circumstances, the
court's decision would be without actual, direct effect. In one well-known case,
DeFunis v. Odegaard, a student who had been ordered admitted to the
University of Washington School of Law after challenging its affirmative
action policy was close to graduation by the time his appeal reached the
Supreme Court."o The Court explained that since there was little chance that
the student would fail to finish his degree even if he were to lose his appeal, the
case had become moot.
Commentators are generally in agreement that the doctrinal intricacies
of mootness cannot be based solely on the text of Article III. The "case or
controversy" language, as Justice Scalia has noted, has "virtually no meaning
except by reference to [a common law] tradition" that places restrictions on

49. Post and Siegel are critical of this development. While the full scope of their criticism is
beyond the scope of this Comment, the point most relevant to my analysis is roughly as
follows. Under Boerne, the right that Congress can grant individuals is limited to protection
from irrationaldiscrimination. This is inappropriate: rational basis review may force courts
to defer to the rationality of state action in many cases in which discrimination was actually
invidious, because of the judiciary's institutional limitations. However, it makes no sense to
force this deference upon Congress. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by
Law: FederalAntidiscriminationLegislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 46469 (2000); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five
Power: PolicentricInterpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1970-71
(2003). Second, the evidence-collection requirement means that judicial factfinding and
evidentiary requirements have inappropriately been applied to congressional proceedings.

Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric
Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 13 (2003) ("[W]hat lends Garrett's logic its
cloak of plausibility is the implicit evocation of a judicial paradigm of evidentiary
relevance."); see id. at 7-17 (making the point more fully).
50.

1272

416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974).
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judicial power." (Justice Scalia goes on to add, however, that the judicial
application of this historically constructed limitation is still constitutionally
required.) According to some, therefore, the doctrine has been developed and
embellished based on a vision of separation of powers. Courts (and, for that
matter, commentators) begin with an idea of the "role" judges should play in a
case and accordingly develop the metes and bounds of the doctrine." Thus,
some suggest, the mootness doctrine floats free of the text of Article III: it can
be seen as a general doctrine of restraint designed to allow an institution or
branch of government to act only as long as a problem that the institution has
been designed to solve exists.
Just as a vision of horizontal separation of powers between departments of
government animates the mootness doctrine, a vision of vertical separation of
powers between the federal and state governments animates Section 5 doctrine.
Congress's ability to strip states of their sovereign immunity is limited at the
outset to only those cases where it has evidence of violations, just as a judicial
role is restricted to actual cases or controversies. Similarly, this congressional
ability survives only as long as the violations are ongoing.
Understanding the Court's rationale in this manner opens up the
possibility of a counterargument, also based on Article III rationales. The
mootness doctrine is subject to an exception. A case does not become moot
simply because defendants voluntarily cease their activity; rather, in the case of
voluntary cessation, a case becomes moot only if "subsequent events made it
absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be
expected to recur."" This doctrine's roots are drawn from United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, an 1897 antitrust case in which the Court was
faced with a request for an injunction to dissolve a cartel and prevent future
collusion. The defendants dissolved on their own, then argued that this
dissolution rendered the case moot. The Court, however, explained that should
the case be considered moot, "the relief granted [would not be] adequate to the

(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Evan Tsen Lee,
DeconstitutionalizingJusticiability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603, 623-25,

51. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 340 (1988)

637 (1992) (calling for the "deconstitutionalization of mootness").
52.

Lee, supra note 51; see also Matthew I. Hall, The PartiallyPrudentialDoctrine of Mootness, 77
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 562, 565-66 (2009) (noting that mootness doctrine is partially
prudential); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist
Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 490 (1996) ("Until 1964, . . . the Court treated mootness

not as an Article III requirement but as an equitable determination. . . . [M]ootness is, and
always has been, a matter of discretion" rather than mandated by the Constitution.) The
idea of the institutional role of courts is developed based on constitutional text and broader
sociopolitical values.
53.

United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968).
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occasion."" The defendants' response was deficient in at least two ways: first,
they had not proved that their actions would not recur. Further, voluntary
dissolution did not provide as sufficient a remedy as an injunction, which
would prohibit future collusion as well.ss The reasoning behind the voluntary
cessation exception to the mootness doctrine has largely remained the same
since Trans-Missouri.
The exception remains relevant in the case of enactments, at least at the
municipal level. In City ofMesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., the trial court found
a city ordinance void for vagueness. During the appeal process, the city
repealed the vague language.' 6 The Supreme Court explained that "the city's
repeal of the objectionable language would not preclude it from reenacting
precisely the same provision if the District Court's judgment were vacated" as
moot. 7 Hence, the court of appeals did not err in judging the case on its
merits." The Court recently restated this point in the equal protection context.
Faced with a school desegregation program in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. i, the Court explained that because of the
voluntary cessation exception, the voluntary pause of a desegregation plan in
one of the defendant districts did not render the case moot.s"
Thus, just as judicial remedies are restricted to live controversies, the Court
might well decide that Congress should be able to create sovereignty-stripping
remedies only when state violations are ongoing. However, as in the mootness
context, voluntary cessation would remain problematic. Trans-Missouri
Freight's analysis helps us recognize why leaving the solution to existing state
legislation might not solve the problem. Just as court-ordered remedies for the
plaintiffs in Trans-Missouri Freight went beyond the remedy provided by
defendants' voluntary cartel dissolution, by ensuring that the cartel would not
re-form, so too might congressional legislation provide remedies that go
beyond those available under existing, anemic state enforcement mechanisms.
ENDA raises exactly these concerns, as the remedies that states currently
provide are anemic, and indeed, are subject to repeal. The Williams Institute
notes that of the few cities and counties that responded to its survey, two
incorrectly referred employee complaints regarding discrimination to the

54.

166 U.S. 290, 308 (1897).

55.

See United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953).

s6. 455 U.S. 283 (1982).
57.

Id. at 289.

58.

See also Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville,
508 U.S. 656, 661-62 (1993) (citing City ofMesquite).

59.

551 U.S. 701, 719 (2007).
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EEOC (which has no federal mandate to address them). o One respondent was
unaware of its own antidiscrimination provisions, another did not know what
enforcement mechanisms were in place, and several lacked the resources to
provide data or handle complaints." Similarly, local provisions often have
lower caps on damages, lack compensation for attorney's fees, or fail to protect
discrimination based on perceived orientation.6' Executive orders prohibiting
discrimination fail to create a private cause of action and are not always backed
up by investigative mechanisms." Courts have also found that some localities'
provisions are preempted by federal law.6 4 Thus, only Congress can pass a bill
that would definitively prevent localities' discrimination.
More important is the fact that local laws provide no guarantee against
future discrimination. Justice Kennedy's reasoning can be expanded in ways
that cause concern. If Congress cannot act when state laws prohibit
discrimination, it may not be allowed to act where all that exists is a stated
policy against discrimination (which does not provide for a cause of action), or
even where no complaints of discrimination have been filed against a
municipality in a given year (which may suggest that the problem of
discrimination has ended). Voluntary state action-be it the enactment of
statutes or cessation of discrimination- is not a guarantee against future
discrimination.
Furthermore, even ordinances and statutes are subject to repeal, as was the
ordinance in City of Mesquite. The most prominent example is a constitutional
amendment enacted by the people of Colorado that overturned the local
ordinances of various Colorado cities and counties prohibiting LGB
discrimination in employment. Similarly, the private employment protections
adopted by Cincinnati's city council in 1992 were revoked by a public vote in
1993; the Sixth Circuit upheld that vote.6 6 There have been other efforts to

6o.

WILLIAMS INST., Executive Summary of DOCUMENTING DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY IN STATE EMPLOYMENT 11-12 (2009), available

61.

at http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/programs/EmploymentReportsENDA.html.
Id. at 12.

62.

Id. at 16.

63.

Id.

64. See Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. City of S.F., 992 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. Cal. 1998)

6s.

66.

(invalidating a domestic partnership benefits ordinance because federal law preempts
localities from regulating the air traffic system); Council of N.Y. v. Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d
433 (N.Y. 20o6) (state and federal law preempts a benefits ordinance).
"Amendment 2," as it was called when presented to voters in Colorado, was ultimately
invalidated by the Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati,

128

F.3d 289 (6th Cit. 1997).
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overturn ordinances, or elements of ordinances, in the last few years through
litigation. While many have been unsuccessful, 67 several have succeeded.
Finally, constitutional amendment initiatives to repeal gay rights legislation
suggest that antidiscrimination provisions are still in danger. Most successful
constitutional amendments have targeted same-sex marriage."' However, some
opponents of ENDA use antimarriage rhetoric to target antidiscrimination
provisions, arguing that these provisions are the stepping stone to "gay
marriage, [and] married couple benefits." 70 As a result, it is altogether
foreseeable that successful antimarriage efforts might spill over into the
employment discrimination context, resulting in the repeal of local
antidiscrimination provisions.
As such, the congressional remedy in ENDA goes further than those of
states by creating robust reporting and recording mechanisms.7 ' But more
importantly, even if states have voluntarily ceased discrimination, this should
not be dispositive: as with mootness doctrine, Congress should be able to act in
these cases of voluntary cessation to protect against future rights violations.
CONCLUSION

Even though Congress has compiled evidence of anti-gay discrimination,
existing state law provisions that protect gays against employment
discrimination may be fatal to ENDA. Understanding the rationale behind
Section 5 restraints as analogous to those underlying Article III restraints

67.

See, e.g., Hyman v. City of Louisville, 53 Fed. App'x 74o (6th Cit. 2002); S.D. Myers, Inc. v.
City & Cnty. of S.F., 253 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 2oo); Heinsma v. City of Vancouver, 29 P. 3 d
709 (Wash. 2001); see also Marriage& PartnershipLitigation Notes: Louisiana-New Orleans,
2004 LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES 100-01 (discussing an unpublished case from the Louisiana
courts).

68. See supra note 64.
69. See supra note 43.
70. ENDA: THREATENS CHRIsTIANS & BUSINESS OWNERS, TRADITIONAL VALUES COALITION,
http://www.traditionalvalues.org/modules.php?sid=3753# (last visited Oct. 7, 2010); see also
Thomas Messner, THE HERITAGE FOUND., Executive Sum man of ENDA AND THE PATH 10
http://wwv.heritage.org/Research/Reports/20o9/o9/Executive
MARPJAGE,
SAME-SEX
-Summary-ENDA-and-the-Path-to-Same-Sex-Marriage ("[L]aws like ENDA have already
proved to be an important step toward legal recognition for homosexual unions in several
); Issues: Marriage, LIBERTY INST., http://freemarket.org/issues.php?category=
states ....
7&article= 8 (last visited Oct. 7, 2010) ("ENDA . . . is one of the gravest threats to . . .
traditional marriage today.").
71. Cf Nevada v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735 (2003) (upholding FMLA provisions after finding
congressional remedies superior to those of states).
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provides activists with new and helpful ways to explain to courts the need for
the state-suit provisions of ENDA. It also raises interesting questions of the
institutional competencies of Congress versus those of courts, as well as
interesting questions of federal-state relations, all of which are ripe for further
analysis.
CRAIG KONNOTH
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